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We study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent’s transfers on
the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agents’ types. Cr´ emer and McLean
(Econometrica, 53(1985) 345-361; 56(1988) 1247-1258), McAfee and Reny (Econometrica, 6(1992)
395-421), Riordan and Sappington (JET, 45(1988) 189-199) studied situations where either the
signals are rich enough, or the conditional signal distributions and agents’ payoﬀs are such that a
mechanism can be designed to fully extract the surplus from every agent. In this paper, we study
the optimal utilization of the signals when full surplus extraction may not be possible. We assume
that the cardinality of the signal space is smaller than that of the type space and the Riordan and
Sappington conditions do not always hold. We study the optimal ways to utilize the signals. For
some tractable special cases, we investigate the optimal mechanism and the level of surplus that
can be extracted, and identify the agent types who obtain rent.
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In this paper we study the mechanism design problem when the principal (the mechanism designer)
can condition the agent’s transfers on the realization of ex post signals (i.e., signals that are realized
after the agent reports his type) that are correlated with the agent’s type. Cr´ emer and McLean
(1985, 1988) (CM hereafter), McAfee and Reny (1992) (MR), and Riordan and Sappington (1988)
(RS) provided conditions under which the principal can design a mechanism that fully extracts
the surplus from every agent type. In particular, CM showed that if the matrix of the conditional
probabilities of the signals given the agent types has full rank, then full surplus can be extracted
through dominant strategy implementation. Under the condition that no row of the matrix is within
the convex hull of the other rows, the same can be attained through Bayesian implementation. MR
extended CM to a setting of inﬁnite type space and to many other applications involving asymmetric
information. Further, these conditions on the conditional signal distributions are necessary and
suﬃcient for full surplus to be extracted for all possible payoﬀ functions of the agents. RS, on the
other hand, provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the conditional signal distributions and
agents’ payoﬀ functions for full surplus extraction when the full rank or convex hull conditions are
not satisﬁed.
In this paper, we study the optimal use of the ex post signals to condition the agent’s transfers
when full surplus extraction may not be possible. In particular, how should the signals be utilized?
What happens to the optimal allocation proﬁle? How much surplus can still be extracted given
the signals? And which agent types will obtain rent in the optimal mechanism? Answers to these
questions are valuable, since in many applications full surplus extraction may not be possible either
because the set of ex post signals is not rich enough (as required in CM-MR), or because the agents’
payoﬀ and signal distribution functions do not satisfy the conditions identiﬁed in RS. For example,
for the results in CM-MR to hold generically, the cardinality of the signal space is required to be
at least as large as that of the type space. In many situations - government regulation, provision
1of public goods, insurance contracts, etc. - it is much more likely that the number of available
signals is not as large as the number of types. For instance, the regulatory body may not know the
abatement costs in reducing industrial pollution of the ﬁrms it regulates, but can observe certain
characteristics of the ﬁrms. While there are potentially inﬁnite levels of abatement costs (or types),
the observable factors (or signals) are ﬁnite and typically few (e.g., ﬁrm size, industry classiﬁcation,
etc.). In automobile insurance, there are many types of “risky” drivers, but the insurers can observe
only limited pieces of information, such as the number of car accidents or the age of the driver.
In essence, the signal space represents information that the designer can obtain without incurring
any cost in information gathering. In reality, at least some signal gathering might be costly and
when the type space is large, generating an equally large signal space may involve extremely high
costs. It is then natural to assume a relatively small signal space in such applications.1 With fewer
signals than types, determining the optimal mechanism is important when the condition on payoﬀ
functions identiﬁed in RS does not hold and therefore full surplus cannot be extracted.
We consider mechanisms in which the transfer is partitioned into two components: a (type-
dependent) ﬁxed payment and a (type-dependent) lottery that is a function of the realized signals.
We ﬁrst show that the mechanism designer can do no better than to choose lotteries such that,
under truth-telling, each type’s expected payment from the lottery is zero. That is, the lotteries
are used solely to help with the incentive constraints, i.e., to discourage the agent from making
false reports about his type. More speciﬁcally, if a type’s vector of conditional signal probabilities,
called a signal vector, lies outside the convex hull of the signal vectors of all the other types, Farkas’
Lemma implies existence of lotteries that lead to zero expected payment under truth-telling but
arbitrarily large penalties under false-reporting. If a type’s signal vector lies within the convex hull
1In applications like auctions where bid of one agent can be used as a signal of another, the full rank assumption
might seem natural. However, even here, if bidders’ types are drawn from asymmetric distributions with ﬁnite
supports, there is no reason why the cardinalities of the supports of these diﬀerent distributions must always be the
same. Further, as Parreiras (2005) shows, even when the types are drawn from symmetric distributions, the full rank
condition may still fail when the principal does not know for sure the bidders’ beliefs about each other’s types.
2of those of the other types, then a transfer schedule for this type can always be replaced by an
equivalent new schedule that maintains participation and incentive compatibility constraints for
all types as in the original, but where the expected payment from the new lottery is zero under
truth-telling. Therefore, for all types, the search for optimal lotteries can be restricted to those that
have zero expected value under truth-telling. Apart from tying our work with the earlier literature,
this result is useful in simplifying the search for the optimal lotteries.2
We next consider the nature of the optimal mechanism. By concentrating on special cases
that keep the analysis tractable, we are able to highlight the qualitative features of the optimal
mechanism and to contrast it with those in CM-RS as well as in the standard mechanism design
problems without signals. An important insight is that not only does the presence of the signals
reduce the information rent of the agent, but it does so by allowing the principal to redistribute the
information rents of the types. When designing the lottery for a type, say θi,w h a ti si m p o r t a n t
is the aggregate (a weighted sum of) incentives of the other types to report θi. Hence, a type, say
θk, who in the absence of the signals has disincentive to report θi, plays an important role in the
presence of the signals; the principal can use the disincentive of types like θk to reduce the rents of
the other types who would gain from reporting θi. We also show that which type obtains rent in
the optimal mechanism follows a fairly intuitive condition involving the prior beliefs on the types
and a measure of “similarity” among the signal vectors of the various types.
While our objective is to study the impact of less “informationally rich” signals, other researchers
have investigated the eﬀect of relaxing other aspects of CM-MR-RS. It has long been recognized that
risk-neutrality and the lack of limited liability constraints are crucial for the full surplus extraction
results. Robert (1991) considers an auction problem similar to that in CM and show how the
presence of risk-aversion or an upper bound on the transfers bidders pay may prevent the auctioneer
2Neither CM nor MR partitions the transfer into a ﬁxed payment and a lottery in the formal description of their
model. However, see page 1253 of CM (1988) where this partition is used in the proof of Theorem 2. See also the
introduction in MR (pp 397-398) for a discussion of the usefullness of this partition.
3from extracting full surplus. Kosmopolou and Williams (1998) consider a similar model of group
decision making but with a continuum of types. They show that the ﬁrst-best allocation cannot
be implemented when the agent types are approximately independent, and either the monetary
transfers amongst agents or their ex post payoﬀs have to satisfy a limited liability constraint.
Demougin and Garvie (1991) study optimal regulation with a continuum of ﬁrm types, correlated
information and non-negative limited liability constraints. Gary-Bobo and Spiegel (forthcoming)3
study an optimal regulation problem with a continuous type space and ﬁnite signals, and assume
the same conditions on costs and signals found in RS, but with the restriction that ex post payoﬀs
of the agent are not allowed to fall below a certain level in every state. This level is varied to show
the impact of the limited liability constraint; in particular when this level is suﬃciently high, one
obtains the full surplus extraction result of RS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section 2 and explore a
simple example to preview our main results and intuition in Section 3. Section 4 shows that the
optimal design of lotteries involves, without any loss of generality, zero expected lottery payments
under truth-telling. Next, we study the optimal mechanism by focusing on some special cases. In
Section 5, the number of signals is one less than the number of types, while Section 6 extends this
to the case when the number of types is two more than the number of signals. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix A shows the relation between our results and those in RS. Appendix B contains the
proofs.
2M o d e l S e t u p
Consider a mechanism design problem with a principal and an agent where the principal can
condition the agent’s transfer on a set of ex post veriﬁable signals that are correlated with the
3We thank an Associate Editor for drawing our attention to this paper.
4agent’s type.4 Because of the revelation principle, we focus on the direct revelation mechanism
without any loss of generality. The timing of the moves is as follows. (i) The principal announces
a mechanism which consists of a set of schedules, one for each type that speciﬁes the required
allocation and a signal-contingent transfer (or payment) from the agent to the principal; (ii) the
agent reports a type (which is equivalent to selecting a schedule); (iii) the allocation is undertaken;
(iv) a signal is observed; and ﬁnally (v) the transfer is made.
The principal has preferences given by W(x)+T,w h e r ex ≥ 0 is the allocation and T is the
transfer. The agent also has quasilinear preferences given by u(x,θ)−T,w h e r eθ, the agent’s type,
is his private information. The types are drawn from a ﬁnite type space, θ ∈ Θ={θ1,θ 2,...,θ N}
with N ≥ 2. We use μi to denote the commonly known prior that the agent is of type θi. To rule
out redundancy, we assume μi > 0 for all i. The reservation utility of all types is the same and is
normalized to zero. We make the following assumptions on u(·,·)a n dW(·).









dx2 ≤ 0, and (d) u(0,θ)=0for all θ.
Parts (a),(b) and (c) are standard, and (d) allows all agent types to participate in the mechanism
without loss of generality.
The principal can costlessly observe a veriﬁable signal which is a random variable correlated with
the agent’s type. The ﬁnite signal space is {σ1,σ 2,...,σS} with S ≥ 2. Let qik be the (conditional)
probability of observing signal σk when the agent’s type is θi. Given the presence of the signals,
the principal can make the transfer to be conditional on the signal realizations. For convenience,
we partition the transfer T into two components: for a report of type θj, the transfer consists of
a non-random payment tj, and a lottery with payment of yjs when signal σs is realized. Thus, if
type θi reports θj, his total expected payment would be tj +
 S
s=1 qisyjs.
To facilitate discussion, we use the following notations:
4In the concluding section we brieﬂy discuss how the present analysis can be extended to a multiple agent scenario.
5Notation 1 (a) Let qi =( qi1,q i2,...,q iS),c a l l e dθi’s signal vector,b et h er o wv e c t o ro ft y p eθi’s
conditional signal probabilities. Let the N×S matrix Q =( q1,q2,...,qN) , called the signal matrix,
be the matrix of the conditional signal probabilities of all types.
(b) Let yi =( yi1,...,y iS)  be the payment lottery when the agent reports type θi.
(c) Let fj(xi) ≡ u(xi,θ j) − u(xi,θ i) denote the “intrinsic rent” (alternatively called “intrinsic
incentive”) of type θj reporting (or pretending to be) type θi, measuring the extra utility to θj
relative to θi if both are given θi’s allocation xi.
(d) Suppose {ri} is an arbitrary collection of vectors from some ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space.
Let co{ri} denote the convex hull of the vectors {ri}, i.e., it is the smallest convex set that contains
all the vectors {ri}.
(e) Let N = {1,...,N}, N1 = {i ∈N: qi / ∈ co{qj,j∈N,j = i}} and N2 = N\N1. Thus, N1 is
the collection of the indices of types whose signal vectors are not in the convex hull of those of the
other types. If i ∈N k, k =1 ,2, we say θi corresponds to Nk,o rs i m p l yθi is in Nk.
(f) For any arbitrary subset of N, K⊂N , let the matrix QK =( qi,i∈K )  be the matrix of the
signal vectors of types corresponding to the index set K.
We follow the convention that vectors and matrices are denoted by bold letters (as in q and
Q), and sets and collections are represented by calligraphic capital letters (as in N). We make the
following assumptions related to the signals:
Assumption 2 (a) S<N ;( b )N2 is non-empty; (c) The rank of Q is S.F u r t h e r ,qi  = qj for
i  = j, i,j,∈N.
That is, there are more types than signals, and there is at least one type whose signal vector lies
in the convex hull of those of the other types. Assumption 2(c) implies that {qi,i∈N 1} contains
at least S elements and that a basis for RS can always be chosen from the elements of {qi,i∈N 1}.
6Remark 1 Since {qi,i∈N 1} forms the extreme points of the set co{qj,j∈N} , every qj, j ∈N 2,
lies in the convex hull of the signal vectors corresponding to N1 only. That is ∀j ∈N 2, qj ∈
co{qi,i∈N 1}. (See Corollary 18.5.1 of Rockafellar (1970).)






s. t. (PC-i) u(xi,θ i) − ti − qiyi ≥ 0, ∀i
(ICC-i) u(xj,θ j) − tj − qjyj ≥ u(xi,θ j) − ti − qjyi, ∀j, ∀i,
(P)
where (PC-i) is the participation constraint of type θi, and (ICC-i) are the incentive compatibility
constraints of reporting θi. Note that (ICC-i) refers to the constraints that no other type should
report θi.
Deﬁnition 1 (i) Given an allocation proﬁle {xi,i∈N} , we say the principal extracts full rent if
(PC-i) is binding for all types.
(ii) The full information allocation proﬁle {xFI
i ,i∈N}is the allocation proﬁle when (P) is solved
in the absence of the incentive compatibility constraints (ICC-i) for all i.
(iii) We say the principal extracts full surplus if in (P), full rent is extracted for the allocation
{xFI
i ,i∈N} .
(iv) We say a type θj has incentive to report θi if u(xi,θ j) − ti − qjyi > 0.
The literature on mechanism design has focused mainly on two polar cases: the independent
case, when there are no ex post signals, and the case of CM-MR, where for all i ∈N, qi / ∈
co{qj,j ∈N ,j  = i} (i.e., N1 = N). RS, like us, falls between the two polar cases. However, as
mentioned before, their objective is to study joint restrictions on payoﬀs and signals that allow full











Figure 1: The Use of Perpendicular Lotteries
3A n E x a m p l e
Before presenting the formal analysis, we ﬁrst analyze a simple example to highlight our main results
and to explain the intuition. Consider the example of a single buyer and a seller, with the seller
being the principal and the buyer being the agent. Let x ≥ 0 be the units of the good purchased,
and u(x,θ) the buyer’s utility from consumption. Let there be three types, Θ = {θ1,θ 2,θ 3}. Suppose
that the buyer and the seller can costlessly observe a veriﬁable binary signal (for example, whether
the state of demand in some other market is high or low) that is correlated with the buyer’s type
and can be used to condition the buyer’s payment to the seller. Throughout, we consider the direct
revelation mechanism.
Figure 1 illustrates one possible layout of the signal vectors q1, q2 and q3. In this case, q2 ∈
co{q1,q3}, i.e., q2 = λ1q1 +λ3q3,w i t hλ1 > 0, λ3 > 0a n dλ1 +λ3 =1 .T h u s ,t h eC Mc o n v e xh u l l
conditions fail, and it is not possible to guarantee full surplus extraction for all payoﬀ functions
u(·).
We start by exploring the nature of the lotteries for the three types. Consider ﬁrst the types
8corresponding to N1 = {1,3} only. Since neither q1 nor q3 belongs to the convex hulls of other
signal vectors, Farkas’ Lemma implies existence of lotteries y1 and y3 such that qiyi =0a n d
qjyi > 0f o rj ∈{ 1,2,3}, i ∈{ 1,3} and j  = i.5 Such lotteries y1 and y3 are shown in Figure 1.
Similar to CM, by making ||y1|| and ||y3|| suﬃciently large, we ensure that no type has incentive
to falsely report θ1 or θ3. Thus, in problem (P), the incentive compatibility constraints of reporting
θ1 and θ3, (ICC-1) and (ICC-3), are made slack and can be ignored in searching for the optimal
mechanism.
The remaining, and more interesting, question concerns the lottery for θ2. It is still possible to
have a lottery y2 such that q2y2 = 0; however, it is not possible to have both q1y2 and q3y2 to be
positive, and one might wonder whether we will need to search for other kinds of lotteries to utilize
the signals optimally. We show (in Proposition 1) no need to do so: without any loss of generality,
we can consider only lotteries that have zero expected value under truth-telling, i.e., consider only
y2 such that q2y2 =0 .
To see this, consider a mechanism {ˆ ti,x i, ˆ yi,i =1 ,2,3} satisfying all the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints in (P), and where the lottery ˆ y2 is such that q2ˆ y2  =0( a ss h o w n
in Figure 1). Below we illustrate an alternative mechanism that gives the same expected payoﬀ to
the principal and all agent types as in the original one, while also satisfying the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints for all types in (P); however, the lottery in the new mechanism
is perpendicular to vector q2.
The new mechanism preserves the schedules for θ1 and θ3 in the original mechanism, {ˆ t1,x 1, ˆ y1}
and {ˆ t3,x 3, ˆ y3}, and the same allocation for θ2, x2.T h eonly change made is in the transfer part
o ft h es c h e d u l ef o rθ2, which is changed to {t2,y2} with t2 = ˆ t2+q2ˆ y2 and y2 = ˆ y2−q2ˆ y21,w h e r e
5This application of Farkas’ Lemma is somewhat diﬀerent from that in CM where N2 is empty, i.e., there are only
types θ1 and θ3, and the Lemma is used to show that qiyi =0a n dqjyi > 0f o rj ∈{ 1,3} only. However, having
q2 does not aﬀect applying the Lemma to ﬁnd y1 and y3;a sl o n ga sqi does not belong to the cone generated by
the other vectors qj, j  = i, regardless of how many other vectors there are, the Lemma gurantees existence of a
hyperplane yi that separates qi from the cone.
91 =( 1 ,1)  is the unit vector in R2.S i n c eq21 = 1, it follows that q2y2 =0 .
In the original mechanism, the total transfer (i.e., combining the ﬁxed and the lottery compo-
nents) of any type reporting θ2, contingent on the signals is represented by vector ˆ t21 + ˆ y2.T h i s
vector can be rewritten as (ˆ t2 + q2ˆ y2)1 +(ˆ y2 − q2ˆ y21)=t21 + y2, the total contingent transfer
of reporting θ2 in the new mechanism. Therefore, for every type, including θ2, its total contingent
transfer upon reporting θ2 is preserved in the new mechanism, and hence its expected total transfer
upon reporting θ2 remains unaltered as well. Since the schedules of types θ1 and θ3 as well as the
allocation for all types have not been changed, if the original mechanism satisﬁes all the participa-
tion and incentive compatibility constraints, so must the new mechanism. Also, since every agent
type receives the same expected payoﬀ as before, the principal’s expected payoﬀ must also remain
unchanged.
Essentially, in constructing the new schedule for θ2, we remove a certain amount from the
lottery part of the transfer (i.e., subtract an equal amount for every signal realization) and add the
same amount to the non-random part. By setting this amount to be θ2’s expected lottery payment
under the original schedule, the resulting lottery y2 satisﬁes q2y2 = 0. Furthermore, doing this
does not change the total payment of any type reporting θ2, so that the participation and incentive
compatibility constraints remain satisﬁed as well.
We now turn to the characterization of the optimal mechanism. In particular, when full surplus
cannot be extracted, we describe the condition that identiﬁes the type(s) who obtains rent. We
also note interesting diﬀerences and similarities between the optimal mechanism here and the one
that is obtained when there are no correlated signals.
The crucial element in the subsequent analysis is not the lottery y2, but the amounts types
θ1 or θ3 expect to pay upon reporting θ2. Rather than working with vector y2, we ﬁnd it more
convenient to work with the expected lottery payments zi where zi = qiy2,i=1 ,3. Note that since
(q1 q3) y2 =( z1 z3)  and {q1,q3} f o r m sab a s i sf o rR2, each y2 uniquely deﬁnes {z1,z 3} and vice
10versa. Since q2 = λ1q1 + λ3q3, the condition q2y2 = 0 implies the (only) restriction on z1 and z3:
λ1z1 + λ3z3 =0 .
Given any allocation, since all types other than θ2 lie in N1,t y p eθ2 cannot obtain any rent and
t2 should optimally be set equal to u(x2,θ 2). In fact, since no type can obtain rent by reporting types
in N1, the only source of rent comes from some type(s) having incentive to report θ2. Therefore in
(P), we only need to consider (PC-1), (PC-3), and (ICC-2):
u(xi,θ i) − ti ≥ 0; i =1 ,3
u(xi,θ i) − ti ≥ u(x2,θ i) − t2 − zi; i =1 ,3.
(1)
Substituting in t2 = u(x2,θ 2), and recalling that fi(x2)=u(x2,θ i) − u(x2,θ 2), we can combine
the two constraints in (1) as ti ≤ u(xi,θ i)−max{0,f i(x2)−zi},i=1 ,3. Since the principal prefers
higher payments from the agent, we can write the inequality as an equality:
ti = u(xi,θ i) − max{0,f i(x2) − zi}; i =1 ,3. (2)
From this expression and (1), we see that θi obtains rent if zi <f i(x2), and its incentive compat-
ibility constraint of reporting θ2 is slack when zi >f i(x2). This representation also allows us to





μi [u(xi,θ i) − max{0,f i(x2) − zi}]+μ2u(x2,θ 2). (3)
From (3), the principal has incentive to raise the zi’s in order to reduce the rent, if any, to the
agent types. But since the zi’s have to satisfy λ1z1 + λ3z3 = 0, when one of the zi’s is increased,
the other has to be reduced accordingly. While a higher zi reduces the rent to θi if fi(x2)−zi > 0,
al o w e rzj does not aﬀect the zero rent to θj if fj(x2) − zj < 0. Thus, the principal can choose the
zi’s based on, among other factors, the relative signs and magnitudes of f1(x2)a n df3(x2). This
observation leads to the crucial insight - one on which the remainder of the analysis rests - that the
presence of the correlated signals allows the principal to redistribute rents amongst the types. As
in the case without the signals, diﬀerent values of x2 result in diﬀerent amount of “intrinsic” rents,
11fi(x2). However, now the principal can choose z1 and z3 b a s e do nt h ev a l u e so ff1(x2)a n df3(x2)
to determine the actual amount of rent each type may obtain in the optimal mechanism.
We now show the ﬁrst feature of the optimal solution that departs from that when there are
no signals. Suppose that in the optimal solution there is a type θ1 or θ3 who obtains rent. Then,
the incentive compatibility constraints of both θ1 and θ3 reporting θ2 must bind. (Without signals,
in general, only the incentive compatibility constraint of the type that obtains rent binds.) To see
why, suppose θ3 obtains rent, i.e., f3(x2) − z3 > 0, but the incentive compatibility constraint of θ1
reporting θ2 is slack, i.e., f1(x2) − z1 < 0. This cannot be optimal since by reducing z1 slightly, z3
can be increased while still satisfying λ1z1 + λ3z3 = 0, allowing the principal to reduce the rent of
θ3 while θ1 continues to receive no rent.
The above argument helps identify the type, if any, who obtains rent. Suppose full rent cannot
be extracted, so both incentive compatibility constraints (of θ1 and θ3) in (1) bind. Starting from a
situation where both θ1 and θ3 obtain rent, if z1 is increased, the principal’s payoﬀ in (3) is raised
at a rate of μ1. However, z3 has to be decreased by λ1/λ3 to satisfy λ1z1 + λ3z3 = 0, reducing
(3) by μ3λ1/λ3.R a i s i n gz1 beneﬁts the principal if and only if μ1 >μ 3λ1/λ3,o rμ1/λ1 >μ 3/λ3.
Furthermore, as long as μ1/λ1 >μ 3/λ3, this adjustment of z1 and z3 should continue until all rent
accruing to θ1 is eliminated. Thus, when full rent cannot be extracted, which type obtains rent
depends on the relative size of μ1/λ1 and μ3/λ3: θ3 (or θ1) obtains rent if μ1/λ1 > (or <)μ3/λ3.
In a sense,
μ
λ reﬂects the “eﬀective cost” to the seller of giving rent. Other things equal, giving
one unit of rent to θ3 rather than to θ1 has lower expected cost if μ3 ≤ μ1. On the other hand,
λi relates to the extent of similarity between the signals generated by θi and θ2. Hence, the higher
λi is, the more similar θi is to θ2 in terms of their signals, and therefore the more diﬃcult it is to
separate out θi from θ2 through the signals, or to punish θi for reporting θ2.
It is easy to check whether full surplus can be extracted. Given the full information allocation,
xFI
i ,i=1 ,2,3, if full surplus can be extracted then ti = u(xFI
i ,θ i) for all i. But from (2), t1 =
12u(xFI
1 ,θ 1)a n dt3 = u(xFI
3 ,θ 3) implies f1(xFI
2 ) ≤ z1 and f3(xFI
2 ) ≤ z3. Since λ1z1+λ3z3 =0 ,λ1 ≥ 0
and λ3 ≥ 0, these inequalities imply
λ1f1(xFI
2 )+λ3f3(xFI
2 ) ≤ 0. (4)
On the other hand, if (4) is satisﬁed, z1 and z3 can be found that satisfy λ1z1 + λ3z3 =0a n d
fi(xFI
2 ) ≤ zi, i =1 ,3, guaranteeing full surplus extraction. Thus, (4) is the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for full surplus extraction; it is also equivalent to the condition identiﬁed in RS. (See
Appendix A for more detailed discussion.)
Finally, note that in this example N2 = {2}. Suppose that the types are ordered such that
u(x,θi)i si n c r e a s i n gi nθi. If N2 = {1}, then since f3(x1) > 0a n df2(x1) > 0, (4) is always violated
and full surplus can never be extracted. On the other hand, if N2 = {3}, then since f1(x3) < 0a n d
f2(x3) < 0, full surplus can always be extracted.
4 Utilization of Signals
To relate our results to the literature, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the intuition of the results in CM.
In CM, there is no type θi such that qi ∈ co{qj,j ∈N ,j  = i}. Farkas’ Lemma then guarantees
existence of payment lotteries yi, for all i ∈N, such that qiyi =0a n dqjyi > 0f o rj  = i.T h a t
is, the principal can construct a lottery for each type θi, such that the expected cost of the lottery
is zero for θi but positive for other types reporting to be θi. Then by setting the length of yi,
||yi||, to be suﬃciently large, the expected cost of any other type reporting θi is made prohibitively
high. All the incentive compatibility constraints can thus be satisﬁed as non-binding constraints.
Consequently, the optimal allocations are at the full-information levels, and the optimal non-random
transfer is ti = u(xFI
i ,θ i) so that the principal achieves full surplus extraction.
For our purposes, it is useful to observe that an important property of the lotteries in CM
is that under truth-telling, the expected payment from the lotteries is zero. Put diﬀerently, the
13lotteries are not used to transfer payment from the agent to the principal; rather, their sole purpose
is to help satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., to discourage types from making false
reports. The main result of this section shows that this feature of the lotteries carries over to
situations beyond the world of CM. Even when the set of signals is not rich enough to enable full
surplus extraction, we can still utilize the signals optimally by considering only lotteries that have
zero expected value under truth-telling and whose entire purpose, therefore, is to help with the
incentive compatibility constraints.
Since the lotteries for types θi, i ∈N 1,a n dθj, j ∈N 2, are determined diﬀerently, it is convenient
to deﬁne them formally:
Deﬁnition 2 A perpendicular lottery (PL) for type θi is a lottery yi ∈ RS such that qiyi =0 .A
separating lottery (SL) for type θi is a PL yi such that qjyi > 0 for all j ∈N\ i.
For every type θi corresponding to N1, it is possible to have lotteries that are SLs. In other
words, for these types we can have exactly the lotteries of CM.
Lemma 1 For all i ∈N 1, aS Lyi ∈ RS exists for θi.
The proofs are in Appendix B. This lemma implies the following important corollary.
Corollary 1 For all i ∈N 1, by using a SL yi and setting ||yi|| to be suﬃciently large, the incentive
compatibility constraints of reporting θi, (ICC-i), in (P) can be satisﬁed as strict inequalities, i.e.,
u(xj,θ j) − tj − qjyj >u (xi,θ j) − ti − qjyi, j ∈N, j  = i, i ∈N 1.
Thus, whenever a SL exists for a type θi, the principal can make all types θj, j  = i, strictly
prefer not to report θi. When solving the problem (P), we can therefore ignore all the incentive
compatibility constraints (ICC-i) for i ∈N 1.
For types θi, i ∈N 2, there do not exist SLs. However, the following lemma shows that θi’s
schedule can always be chosen such that the lottery for θi is a PL.
14Lemma 2 For any i ∈N 2, consider two schedules (ˆ ti,x i, ˆ yi),a n d(ti,x i,yi) with qiˆ yi  =0 , ti =
ˆ ti + qiˆ yi and yi = ˆ yi − qiˆ yi1,w h e r e1 =( 1 ,...,1)  is the S × 1 unit vector in RS.T h e n , t h e
expected total transfers of every type reporting θi are the same under the two schedules. Further,
yi is a PL: qiyi =0 .
Essentially, starting from the schedule (ˆ ti,x i, ˆ yi), the schedule (ti,x i,yi)f o rθi is constructed
such that the expected lottery payment of every type reporting θi is reduced by an equal amount of
qiˆ yi, while the non-random payment is increased by qiˆ yi. Thus, the expected total payment from
reporting θi, truthfully or falsely, is the same under the original and the new schedule, ensuring
that the two schedules are equivalent. Further, since the expected lottery payment of θi under
truth-telling in the original lottery is qiˆ yi, the expected lottery payment becomes zero in the new
lottery, i.e., qiyi =0 ,o ryi is a PL.
Corollary 1 and Lemma 2 imply that the principal can do no better in utilizing the signals than
to choose the lotteries to be PLs, and whenever possible, SLs. In summary,
Proposition 1 Consider a mechanism {ˆ ti,x i, ˆ yi,i ∈N }that satisﬁes all the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints in (P). Suppose qjˆ yj  =0for some j ∈N. Then there exists an-
other mechanism {ti,x i,yi,i∈N} , also satisfying all the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints in (P), with ti = ˆ ti + qiˆ yi, and qiyi =0 ,∀i ∈N, that implements the same allocation
proﬁle {xi,i∈N} , and in which the principal’s expected payoﬀ is at least as high as in the original
mechanism.
From Corollary 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, we can simplify problem (P) to the following






s. t. (PC-i) u(xi,θ i) − ti ≥ 0, ∀i ∈N
(ICC-i) u(xj,θ j) − tj ≥ u(xi,θ j) − ti − qjyi,j ∈N, ∀i ∈N 2
qiyi =0 ,i ∈N 2.
(P1)
Notice that unlike (P), the objective function, the (PC-i) constraint, and the left hand sides
of (ICC-i) in (P1) include only the non-random payment ti but not qiyi. Further, the (ICC-i)
constraints are for types corresponding to N2 only. Implicit in (P1), SLs with suﬃciently large
lengths are used for types corresponding to N1.
5 Optimal Contract when N = S +1
Despite the simpliﬁcation of (P1) over (P), the analysis is still complicated. We concentrate on a
set of special cases to illustrate the qualitative features of the optimal mechanism. We ﬁrst consider
the situation when the number of types is one more than the number of signals (N = S + 1); this
represents the simplest possible departure from the full rank condition. The analytical tractability
of this case allows us to characterize the solution completely while making it possible to illustrate
the essential diﬀerences (and similarities) between the mechanism design problem here and that in
the independent case. In the following section, we consider the case when N = S + 2 to discuss
some of the additional complications that will arise, especially when there are multiple types in N2.
When N = S + 1, Assumptions 2(b) and (c) imply that N2 is a singleton and N1 has exactly
S elements. Let the single element in N2 be denoted by ˜ n. Since q˜ n ∈co{qi,i∈N 1}, there exist S
scalars λi ≥ 0, i ∈N 1,w i t h
 
i∈N1 λi = 1, such that q˜ n =
 
i∈N1 λiqi. Since the rank of matrix Q
is S, and {qi,i∈N 1} are the extremal vectors of {qi,i∈N} , the set {qi,i∈N 1} f o r m sab a s i sf o r
RS. Thus, λi, i ∈N 1, are unique. Let λ =( λi,i∈N 1)b et h e1× S row vector of the λi’s. For the
16rest of the section, whenever we refer to λi and λ, we will mean this particular choice of λi and λ.
Since in the optimal mechanism θ˜ n has no incentive to report any other types (the associated
lotteries of the other types are all SLs), the principal should not leave θ˜ n any rent. Therefore,
t  n = u(x  n,θ  n). Then the constraints (ICC-˜ n)i n( P 1 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s :
u(xj,θ j) − tj ≥ u(x  n,θ j) − u(x  n,θ  n) − qjy˜ n = fj(x  n) − qjy˜ n,j ∈N 1. (ICC-˜ n)
The constraints (PC-i), i ∈N 1, in (P1) and (ICC-˜ n) can be combined into one set of constraints:
ti ≤ u(xi,θ i)−max{0,f i(x˜ n) − qiy˜ n},i∈N 1. Since the principal would want to choose as high a
ti as possible, the inequalities should be equalities in the optimal mechanism:
ti = u(xi,θ i) − max{0,f i(x˜ n) − qiy˜ n},i ∈N 1. (5)
The crucial element of the subsequent analysis is not the lottery y˜ n itself but the expected
payment from the lottery that a type expects to make upon reporting θ  n. We therefore introduce
notation, zi, called the expected lottery payment (ELP) of θi:
Notation 2 Let zi = qiy˜ n, i ∈N 1,b et h eexpected lottery payment (ELP) of θi. Let z =( zi,i∈
N1) .
Since QN1y˜ n = z,a n dt h eS×S matrix QN1 has full rank, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between y˜ n and z. Furthermore, since λQN1 = q˜ n and thus λQN1y˜ n = q˜ ny˜ n, the constraint
q˜ ny˜ n = 0 in (P1) is satisﬁed if and only if λz = 0, which becomes a constraint on z.





μi[W(xi)+ti]+μ˜ n[W(x˜ n)+u(x˜ n,θ˜ n)]
s.t. (C-i) ti = u(xi,θ i)−max{0,f i(x˜ n) − zi},i ∈N 1
λz =0 ,
(P2)
where (C-i) stands for θi’s combined participation constraint and its incentive compatibility con-
straint of reporting θ˜ n.
17The expression max{0,f i(x˜ n) − zi} represents θi’s expected rent. It is useful to observe that if
zi <f i(x˜ n), θi obtains rent fi(x˜ n) − zi, and the incentive compatibility constraint of θi reporting
θ˜ n is binding. If zi >f i(x˜ n), θi earns no rent and the incentive compatibility constraint is slack. If
the principal can ﬁnd z such that zi ≥ fi(x˜ n) for all i ∈N 1, full rent can be extracted. Even when
full rent cannot be extracted, the transfer ti can be increased - and therefore the rent obtained by
type θi decreased - by raising zi. The only constraint for raising the zi’s is λz =0 . T h i sp o i n t
underlies almost all the major results in this section.
Our ﬁrst result shows that as long as there is some type θi, i ∈N 1, who obtains rent, none of the
incentive compatibility constraints in (P2) can be slack. As discussed in the previous paragraph,
(C-i) only implies that if a type θi gets rent, its own incentive compatibility constraint of reporting
θ˜ n must be binding.
Proposition 2 Suppose in the optimal mechanism there exists a type θi, i ∈N 1, that obtains rent.
Then the incentive compatibility constraints (of reporting θ˜ n)o fa l lt y p e si nN1 whose λ is non-zero
should bind, including those who receive no rent. That is, if ∃i ∈N 1, such that ti <u (xi,θ i), then
zj ≤ fj(x  n) for all j ∈N 1 with λj  =0 .
To understand the intuition, note that if a type, say θi, gets rent, it must be that zi <f i(x  n),
and this rent is reduced if zi can be raised. If a type θj who does not get rent has a slack incentive
compatibility constraint, i.e., if zj >f j(x  n), zj can be reduced a little without aﬀecting the (zero)
rent of θj. Then the principal can improve the mechanism since zi can be raised a little through a
suitable reduction of zj without violating the constraint λz =0 .
Next we characterize the type(s) who obtains rent in the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 3 Given an allocation proﬁle {xi,i∈N} , if full rent cannot be extracted, type θi,i ∈
N1, obtains rent in the optimal mechanism only if
μi






at most one type obtains rent in the optimal mechanism.
18In a sense,
μi
λi measures the eﬀective cost of giving rent to type θi.F o rt w ot y p e s ,s a yθi and
θj, other things equal, giving one unit of rent to θi than to θj has (strictly) lower expected cost
to the principal if μi ≤ (<)μj. On the other hand, λi relates to the extent of similarity between
the signals generated by types θi and θ  n. The higher λi is, the more similar is type θi to type θ  n
in terms of their signals, and the more diﬃcult it is to separate out type θi from type θ  n through
these signals. Put diﬀerently, penalizing type θi is more diﬃcult than penalizing θj through the
utilization of the signals if λi is greater than λj.
As Proposition 3 indicates, which type obtains rent is independent of the allocation proﬁle, or
the extent of the “intrinsic incentive” fi(x˜ n), i ∈N 1,t or e p o r tθ˜ n. However, as we show next, the
allocation proﬁle does aﬀect the magnitude of the rent.



















Furthermore, this rent is continuous in λ.
In the independent case (i.e. without signals), if fk(x˜ n) ≤ 0, i.e., if θk has no intrinsic incentive
to report θ˜ n, the degree of θk’s disincentive to report θ˜ n, i.e., how negative fk(x˜ n) is, does not aﬀect
the total expected rent. In contrast, in Proposition 4, it is the weighted “aggregate” incentive to
report θ˜ n - the weights being the degree of signal similarity λk - that determines the rent that can
be obtained by the agent. An intrinsic disincentive to report θ˜ n (i.e., a negative fk(x˜ n)) is useful
in bringing down the rents of types who obtain rent, and the magnitude of the disincentive aﬀects
the total expected rent.
A corollary of Proposition 4 is that, in general, the total expected rent is strictly lower than
in the independent case.6 This is due to two reasons. First, under the standard independent
6It is obvious that the rent with signals has to be weakly lower than the rent without the signals.
19case, whenever a type, say θk, gets rent, it is determined by the rent he would have obtained by
reporting the type that is the “best” for him to report. In other words, the rent obtained by θk
is the maximum among fk(xj), j ∈N \ k. In (P2), type θk can only report type θ˜ n. Except for
special cases, one would not expect maxj fk(xj)t ob ee q u a lt ofk(x˜ n) for all k. Second, even if
maxj fk(xj)=fk(x˜ n) for all k, the rent would still, in general, be strictly lower than that without














λk max{0,f k(x˜ n)} =
 
k∈N1
μk max{0,f k(x˜ n)},
where the ﬁrst inequality is strict unless fk(x˜ n) ≥ 0f o rall k ∈N 1, while the second inequality is
strict unless
μk
λk is the same for all k ∈N 1. Thus the presence of the correlated signals helps the
principal in two ways: ﬁrst, it prevents many types from getting rent at all, and second, even for
types who get rent, their rent is reduced because through judicious choice of the lotteries, intrinsic
disincentives of some types are used to reduce rent of the types who obtain rent.
Proposition 4 also leads to an easy way to check whether or not full surplus can be extracted.
Proposition 5 Given allocation x˜ n, no type gets any rent if and only if
 
k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n) ≤ 0.
Corollary 2 Full surplus can be extracted if and only if
 
k∈N1 λkfk(xFI
˜ n ) ≤ 0.
The condition in Corollary 2 is equivalent to the necessary and suﬃcient condition in RS. (See
Appendix A for further details.)






















20Proposition 6 The optimal allocation xi for type θi, i ∈N 1, is at its full-information level xFI
i .
If any type θi, i ∈N 1 obtains rent, the optimal allocation x˜ n for θ˜ n is distorted away from xFI
˜ n .
As in other mechanism design problems, the allocations for types corresponding to N1 are at the
full information level since no type has incentive to report these types. It is only θ˜ n whose allocation
x˜ n may be distorted away from the full information level. Note that even under “standard” ordering
assumptions used in the independent case (single crossing, etc.), the optimal allocations may not
be monotonic with types.
6 Optimal Contract when N = S +2
The analysis becomes more complicated, and the algebra more arduous as we move to the general
case of N = S+K, K ≥ 2. To see why, note that in a standard model (i.e., without signals) with N
types, there are in general N(N −1) incentive compatibility constraints to satisfy. However, useful
additional assumptions, for example the single crossing property, and a “regularity” condition on
the distribution of types allow the analysis to be simpliﬁed tremendously. A certain type (a worst-oﬀ
type) can be identiﬁed exogenously whose participation constraint is known to bind in the optimal
solution. Furthermore, because of the additional assumptions, satisfying incentive compatibility
constraints locally guarantees satisfying them globally. The principal’s optimization problem can
be solved as a ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation (involving the N − 1 local incentive compatibility
constraints) without having to use N(N − 1) Lagrangian multipliers.
In our model, when N = S + K, K ≥ 2, it is not necessarily possible to identify exogenously
any “worst” type who cannot obtain rent in the optimal solution (i.e., the one whose participation
constraint will bind in the optimal solution). More importantly, the subset of types who might get
rent by being able to report a type depends on the allocation chosen.7 Below, we discuss the case
7A similar diﬃculty arises in the mechanism design problem with multidimensional types where the subsets of
incentive compatibility constraints that bind at the optimal solution depend on the allocation chosen. As noted by
21when N = S +2 , a situation that allows us to highlight the complexities of the general case while
still keeping the analysis tractable. From Assumptions 2(b) and (c), this case is further divided
into two scenarios: one where N2 is a singleton and the other where N2 contains two elements. In
the ﬁrst case, even though the algebra can be tedious, the problem is still simple conceptually since
there is only one type (corresponding to N2) that other types can report. In the second scenario,
when N2 has multiple elements, the complexities mentioned above comes into full force.
Since the mathematical derivation, though straightforward, is rather tedious, we present only
certain qualitative features of the optimal solution and discuss the intuition behind them. In
particular, we show that parallel to the case of N = S + 1 when full rent cannot be extracted,
(i) types that obtain rent can be characterized using the priors and the parameters describing the
similarity of the signals, (ii) generically no more than two types can obtain rent, and (iii) in such
situations, only a few other types can have slack incentive compatibility constraints. The detailed
derivation of the results is available from the authors upon request.
6.1 N2 is a singleton
Let   n denote the single element in N2.S i n c et h er a n ko fQ is S, and {qi,i∈N 1} are the extremal
elements of the set {qi,i∈N} , there exists an S element subset of QN1 that forms a basis for RS
and the convex hull of which contains the signal vector of θ  n. We denote the indices of the types
belonging to this subset as Nb ⊂N 1. In other words, the matrix QNb contains the S signal vectors
such that {qi,i ∈N b} f o r m sab a s i sf o rRS and q˜ n ∈co{qi,i ∈N b}.8 Let θm b et h et y p es u c h
that m = N1\Nb. Since q˜ n and qm lie in the convex and linear span of {qi,i∈N b} respectively,
there exist unique sets of λi ≥ 0a n dγi, i ∈N b, such that q˜ n =
 
i∈Nb λiqi and qm =
 
i∈Nb γiqi.
As before, we ﬁnd it more convenient to work with the expected lottery payments than with the
Rochet and Stole (2003), “(M)ultiple-dimension problems are diﬃcult precisely when they give rise to endogenous
ordering over the types...”
8Such S vectors may not be unique. However, we can verify that choosing diﬀerent basis vectors does not aﬀect
the optimal mechanism, since diﬀerent sets of basis vectors result in the same two restrictions on the ELPs in (P3)
below.
22lottery y˜ n. Let zm = qmy˜ n be the ELP of θm, and deﬁne z =( zi,i ∈N b)  =( qiy˜ n,i ∈N b) ,
λ =( λi,i∈N b), and γ =( γi,i∈N b). Since λQNb = q˜ n, γQNb = qm,a n dQNby˜ n = z,t h e r ei s
a one-to-one correspondence between y˜ n satisfying q˜ ny˜ n =0a n d{z,z m} satisfying λz =0a n d
γz = zm.
Again, by using SLs, we ensure that no type has incentive to report types corresponding to N1.
Hence if the agent obtains rent, it must be due to some type(s) in N1 having incentive to report
θ  n. Since type θ˜ n obtains no rent, its non-random transfer t˜ n = u(x˜ n,θ˜ n). Thus, similar to the last





μi [W(xi)+ti]+μ˜ n [W(x˜ n)+u(x˜ n,θ˜ n)]
s.t. (C-i) ti = u(xi,θ i) − max{0,f i(x˜ n) − zi},i ∈N 1,
λz =0 ; γz = zm.
(P3)
The basic optimization problem is similar to that in the last section except that now there are
two constraints on the choice of z. For i ∈N b, when the principal raises zi to reduce the rent of this
type, not only will z’s for some other types in Nb have to be reduced so as to satisfy λz = 0, but
zm may also decrease, causing the rent of θm, if any, to increase. Thus which type in Nb obtains
rent in the optimal mechanism depends on whether θm also obtains rent. The next proposition
characterizes the type θi, i ∈N b, that obtains rent when full rent cannot be extracted.
Proposition 7 Suppose allocation x  n is given and full rent cannot be extracted. In the optimal
mechanism, generically there is at most one type in Nb who can obtain rent. In particular,
(a) If θm has a slack incentive compatibility constraint of reporting θ˜ n, i.e., if zm >f m(x˜ n),t h e n

























23When zm >f m(x˜ n), type θm obtains no rent and has a slack incentive compatibility constraint
of reporting θ˜ n.I nt h a tc a s e ,i fzm is reduced by a small amount, θm still obtains no rent and so
this change in zm has no impact on the principal’s expected payoﬀ. The incentive compatibility
constraint of θm can be ignored (locally) and we are essentially back to the situation with N = S+1.
Note the similarity between Propositions 7(a) and 3. When θm obtains rent, reallocating rents of
types in Nb (i.e., varying the zi’s for i ∈N b) also aﬀects the rent of θm (since zm = γz). A higher
γk reﬂects a higher degree of similarity between qk and qm, and hence giving rent to θk increases
θ 
ms rent more than if the rent had been given to some other type with lower γk. Therefore, when
θm and some type from Nb gets rent in the optimal mechanism, the “ideal candidate” type in Nb
to give rent to is one with a small prior (low μk), whose signals are “highly similar” with q˜ n (high
λk), but distinctive from qm (low γk).
Whether type θm obtains rent or has a slack incentive compatibility constraint depends on the
allocation x˜ n. Thus, unlike the case of N = S + 1, the rent structure (i.e., which of the type(s)
obtains rent) may now depend on the allocation proﬁle.
Recall that in the case of N = S + 1, generically there can be at most one type that obtains
rent, and when this occurs, all incentive compatibility constraints of reporting θ˜ n must be binding.
Now with two constraints on the values of the ELP zi’s, we have
Proposition 8 Generically, in the optimal mechanism,
(a) There cannot be more than two types who obtain rent.
(b) If two types obtain rent, then there cannot be a type whose incentive compatibility constraint of
reporting θ˜ n is slack.
(c) If full rent cannot be extracted, there can be at most one type who has a slack incentive com-
patibility constraint of reporting θ˜ n.
As in the last section, the key to understanding the Proposition lies in the principal’s incentive
to raise the zi’s so as to reduce the rents to the agent types. Since there are two restrictions on the
24zi’s, the principal can adjust the values of any three of the zi’s while keeping the values of the others
ﬁxed. (Note that when N = S+1 and there is a single equation restriction on the zi’s, the principal
can adjust any two z’s while keeping the others unchanged.) Since μi/λi or μi/λi+μmγi/λi reﬂects
the relative cost to the principal of giving rent to type θi, if three (or more) types obtain rent, unless
a non-generic situation occurs such that these relative costs of adjusting the zi’s are the same across
the three types, the principal is always able to reduce the rent of the type whose relative cost is the
highest, thereby reducing the total expected rent. This observation underlines Proposition 8(a).
Statements (b) and (c) can be understood in a similar fashion: whenever these conditions fail to
hold, the principal has room to adjust the zi’s to reduce the expected rent.
Similar to the case of N = S +1, the total expected rent of the agent depends on the weighted
sum of the intrinsic incentives of types in N1 to report θ˜ n, fi(x˜ n). Also, in the optimal mechanism,
the allocation of all types in N1 is at the full information level and only x˜ n can be diﬀerent from
xFI
˜ n .
6.2 N2 contains two elements
Let θ  n1 and θ  n2 be the two types corresponding to N2. Since N1 has exactly S elements, {qi,i∈N 1}
form a basis for RS. Thus there exist unique nonnegative 1 × S vectors λ(  n1)=( λi(  n1),i∈N 1)
and λ(  n2)=( λi(  n2),i ∈N 1)w i t h
 
i∈N1 λi(j)=1 ,j =   n1,  n2, such that q  n1 =
 
i∈N1 λi(  n1)qi
and q  n2 =
 
i∈N1 λi(  n2)qi. As before, we work with the expected lottery payments rather than
with the lotteries y  n1 and y  n2 themselves. Since each type in N1 can report either θ˜ n1 or θ˜ n2,
each is associated with two ELPs. Deﬁne z(  n1)=( zi(  n1),i ∈N 1)  =( qiy˜ n1,i ∈N 1)  and
z(  n2)=( zi(  n2),i ∈N 1)  =( qiy˜ n2,i ∈N 1)  as the ELPs of reporting θ˜ n1 and θ˜ n2 respectively.
Since λ(˜ nj)QN1 = q˜ nj, QN1y˜ nj = z(˜ nj), j =1 ,2, and the matrix QN1 has rank S, there is a
one-to-one correspondence between lotteries y  n1 and y  n2 satisfying q˜ n1y˜ n1 =0a n dq˜ n2y˜ n2 =0
and the ELP vectors z(  n1)a n dz(  n2) satisfying λ(  n1)z(  n1)=0a n dλ(  n2)z(  n2)=0 .
25Since each type in N2 (e.g., θ˜ n1) can report to be of the other type (e.g., θ˜ n2), each is associated
with an ELP as well. Deﬁne the scalars z  n1 and z  n2 as z  n1 = q  n1y  n2 and z  n2 = q  n2y  n1. Again,
since λ(˜ nj)QN1 = q˜ nj and QN1y˜ nj = z(˜ nj), j =1 ,2, we know z  n2 = q˜ n2y˜ n1 = λ(˜ n2)QN1y˜ n1 =
λ(  n2)z(  n1), and similarly z  n1 = λ(  n1)z(  n2).
Using SLs for θi, i ∈N 1, no type has any incentive to report types θi, i ∈N 1. The agent’s
information rent can only arise because of types corresponding to N1 having incentive to report
θ˜ n1 and/or θ˜ n2,a n df r o mθ˜ n1 and θ˜ n2 having incentives to report each other. Since a type in N1
can report either θ˜ n1 or θ˜ n2, its rent has to be the maximum of the rents required to prevent it
from reporting either one of θ˜ n1 and θ˜ n2.F o rt h et y p e si nN2, note that θ˜ n1 and θ˜ n2 cannot both
obtain rents from reporting each other; as in standard mechanism design problems (i.e., without
correlated signals), if a type, say θ˜ n1, obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n2, the incentive
compatibility constraint of θ˜ n2 reporting θ˜ n1 must be slack.
It is possible that in the optimal mechanism, incentive compatibility constraints of both types
in N2 are slack (i.e., θ˜ n1 strictly prefers not to report θ˜ n2 and θ˜ n2 strictly prefers not to report θ˜ n1).
Then the optimal ELPs z(˜ n1)a n dz(˜ n2) can be found in exactly the same way as in N = S +1 ,
giving rents, if any, to the type(s) in N1 according to the criterion in Proposition 3. That is, a type
θi, i ∈N 1, is oﬀered rent in order for it not to report θ˜ n1 only if μi/λi(˜ n1)=m i n {μk/λk(˜ n1),k∈
N1},a n dat y p eθj, j ∈N 1 is oﬀered rent in order for it not to report θ˜ n2 only if μj/λj(˜ n2)=
min{μk/λk(˜ n2),k∈N 1}.F o re a c ht y p ei nN1 the ﬁnal rent is the maximum of the rents that needs
to be given such that this type reports truthfully rather than reporting either θ˜ n1 or θ˜ n2.
Of course, it is possible that one type in N2 obtains rent in the optimal mechanism, and for the
remainder of this section, we focus on this case. Without loss of generality, suppose θ˜ n1 obtains
rent (from reporting θ˜ n2), i.e., z˜ n1 <f ˜ n1(x˜ n2), and thus the incentive compatibility constraint of
26θ˜ n2 reporting θ˜ n1 is slack: z˜ n2 >f ˜ n2(x˜ n1). Since θ˜ n2 obtains no rent, we know
t˜ n2 = u(x˜ n2,θ˜ n2),
t˜ n1 = u(x˜ n1,θ˜ n1) − (f˜ n1(x˜ n2) − z˜ n1).
(8)
Since types corresponding to N1 can report either θ˜ n1 or θ˜ n2,w eh a v e
ti = u(xi,θ i) − max
 
0,f i(x˜ n1) − zi(˜ n1)+( f˜ n1(x˜ n2) − z˜ n1),f i(x˜ n2) − zi(˜ n2)
 
,i ∈N 1. (9)
Note that since θ˜ n1 obtains rent, in order to prevent θi from reporting θ˜ n1,t h er e n to fθ˜ n1 has to
be added to that of θi. Thus, the rent needed to prevent θi from reporting θ˜ n1 is the sum of the
two “direct rents,” fi(x˜ n1) − zi(˜ n1)a n df˜ n1(x˜ n2) − z˜ n1.
From (9), if θi in N1 has incentives to report both θ˜ n1 and θ˜ n2, its ﬁnal rent is determined by
the greater of these incentives. The smaller of the two incentives does not matter in determining
θi’s rent or the optimal mechanism. Thus θi can have a slack incentive compatibility constraint
of reporting, say, θ˜ n2,e v e nw h e ni tcan obtain rent from reporting θ˜ n2 if θi can obtain still higher
rent by reporting θ˜ n1. We adopt the following deﬁnition to make this point clear.
Deﬁnition 3 (a) A type θi, i ∈N 1, obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n1 (or has a
slack incentive compatibility constraint of reporting θ˜ n1) if
(fi(x˜ n1) − zi(˜ n1)) + (f˜ n1(x˜ n2) − z˜ n1) > (or <)max{0,f i(x˜ n2) − zi(˜ n2)}.
(b) A type θi, i ∈N 1, obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n2 (or has a slack incentive
compatibility constraint of reporting θ˜ n2) if
fi(x˜ n2) − zi(˜ n2) > (or <)max{0,(fi(x˜ n1) − zi(˜ n1)) + (f˜ n1(x˜ n2) − z˜ n1)}.
Similar to the previous sections, we can write the principal’s problem as :
max
{ti,xi}i∈N,z(˜ n1),z(˜ n2),z˜ n1,z˜ n2
 
i∈N1
μi [W(xi)+ti]+μ˜ n1 [W(x˜ n1)+t˜ n1]+μ˜ n2 [W(x˜ n2)+t˜ n2]
s.t. λ(˜ n1)z(˜ n1)=0 ;λ(˜ n2)z(˜ n2)=0 ;λ(˜ n2)z(˜ n1)=z˜ n2; λ(˜ n1)z(˜ n2)=z˜ n1,
(P4)
where ti, i ∈N 1, are given in (9), and t˜ n1 and t˜ n2 are given in (8).
27The next proposition characterizes the type(s) in N1 who obtains rent when full rent extraction
is impossible.
Proposition 9 Suppose allocations x˜ n1 and x˜ n2 are given. In the optimal mechanism,
(a) If θi, i ∈N 1, obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n1, then it must be that θi has the
lowest μ/λ(˜ n1):







(b) If θi, i ∈N 1, obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n2, then it must be that




















where N1(˜ n1) ⊆N 1 is the index set of the types who obtain rent from having incentive to report
θ˜ n1.
The interpretation of Proposition 9(a) is similar to that of Propositions 3 and 7(a). Since
θ˜ n2 does not obtain rent and its incentive compatibility constraint of reporting any other type is
slack, θ˜ n2 becomes irrelevant (locally) in the optimization problem of choosing the type in (a), and
we are essentially back to the case of N = S +1 . I n( b ) ,s i n c eθ˜ n1 obtains rent, it plays a role
similar to θm in the previous section when θm obtains rent, and Proposition 9(b) is thus parallel
to Proposition 7(b). As in the previous case, a higher λj(˜ n2) means that it is harder to separate
θj from θ˜ n2 through the signals, making it more diﬃcult to use lotteries to reduce the rent of θj.
Further, since θ˜ n1 obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n2, reallocating rents of types in
N1 has to take into consideration the eﬀects on the rent to θ˜ n1.A l o w e r λj(˜ n1) reﬂects a lower
degree of similarity between qj and q˜ n1, and thus a lower amount of rent to θ˜ n1 when giving rent
to θj. Diﬀerent from Proposition 7(b), however, since there could be types in N1 obtaining rent
from having incentive to report θ˜ n1, increasing the rent to θ˜ n1 raises the rent to these types as well.
Thus, the “cost coeﬃcient” of giving rent to θ˜ n1 includes not only μ˜ n1 but also
 
k∈N1(˜ n1) μk.
As in the previous sections, there cannot be too many types who obtain rent, and when some
28types obtain rent, there cannot be too many incentive compatibility constraints that are slack.
Proposition 10 Generically in the optimal mechanism, for k =1 ,2, (a) there is at most one type
in N1 who can obtain rent from having incentive to report θ  nk;
(b) if a type obtains rent from having incentive to report θ  nk, there cannot be a type (with a nonzero
λ(˜ nk)) whose incentive compatibility constraint of reporting θ˜ nk is slack.
When k = 1, this Proposition is similar to Propositions 2 and 3 of the case N = S +1 .
Since θ˜ n2 obtains no rent and has a slack incentive compatibility constraint, it can be ignored in
optimally choosing the z(˜ n1)’s, and the optimization becomes exactly similar to that of the case of
N = S + 1. In particular, as in the case of N = S + 1, if there are two or more types obtaining
rent or having slack incentive compatibility constraints, there is always room for the principal to
adjust the z(˜ n1)’s to reduce the rent. When k = 2, Proposition 10 is parallel to the special case of
Proposition 8 where θm obtains rent. Essentially θ˜ n1 plays the same role here that θm plays there.
Recall that in the previous section when there are two or more types obtaining rent or having slack
incentive compatibility constraints, there is room for the principal to adjust the z(˜ n2)’s to reduce
the rent. That intuition exactly applies to Proposition 10 when k =2 :s i n c eθ˜ n1 already obtains
rent by assumption, there can at most be one other type in N1 who can obtain rent or have a slack
incentive compatibility constraint.
From Deﬁnition 3, if a type θi, i ∈N 1, obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n2 (or θ˜ n1),
it must have a slack incentive compatibility constraint of reporting θ˜ n1 (or θ˜ n2). Then Proposition 10
immediately implies that
Corollary 3 If there is a type θi, i ∈N 1, who obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n1 (or
θ˜ n2), then generically no type in N1 with λ(˜ n1)  =0(or with λ(˜ n2)  =0 ) obtains rent from having
incentive to report θ˜ n2 (or θ˜ n1).
Corollary 3 implies that in Proposition 9(b), generically, the term
 
k∈N1(˜ n1) μk vanishes. This
29is because if θi obtains rent from having incentive to report θ˜ n2, generically no type obtains rent
from having incentive to report θ˜ n1,w h i c hm e a n sN1(˜ n1)=∅. Proposition 10 and Corollary 3
imply the following important corollary.
Corollary 4 In the optimal mechanism, generically there is at most one type in N1 who obtains
rent.
Therefore, in general, at most only one of the two scenarios in Prooposition 9 can arise, further
simplifying the search for the optimal mechanism.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent’s
transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agent’s types. Previous
research identiﬁes conditions that guarantee full surplus extraction; our objective is to understand
the nature of the optimal mechanism when the signals and payoﬀ functions may be such that full
surplus extraction is not possible.
Our ﬁrst result shows that without any loss of generality, the optimal use of the signals involves
using lotteries - one for each type - that have zero expected value under truth-telling. Hence the
signals are used solely for incentive compatibility purposes, even when the CM-MR conditions fail.
The second insight is that in the optimal mechanism, the correlated signals reduce the agent’s
expected rent by allowing the principal to, in eﬀect, “reallocate” intrinsic rents. In CM-MR, the
principal can use lotteries to raise the payments of every type who report another type. In our
case, this can still be done for types corresponding to N1; consequently in the optimal mechanism
no type can obtain rent by reporting types in N1. For types corresponding to N2, when a lottery
is constructed to raise the expected payments of some types when falsely reporting θi,i ∈N 2, the
same lottery reduces the expected payments of some other types falsely reporting θi. Nevertheless,
30the principal can choose which types’ payments to reduce and which types’ to raise. In particular,
and unlike the independent case, a type that has no intrinsic incentive to report θi still plays a
major role; the principal can use such intrinsic disincentives to reduce the expected rents of the
types that have intrinsic incentives to report θi.
Our third contribution is to develop a method of working with expected lottery payments to
study the optimal mechanism. We consider in detail the case when the number of types is one
more than the number of signals. Here, there is a unique worst-oﬀ type: a type who cannot obtain
rent under the optimal mechanism irrespective of the allocation chosen. This greatly facilitates the
explicit characterization of the optimal mechanism. With an arbitrary number of signals and types
-i np a r t i c u l a rw h e nN2 is not a singleton - which types obtain rent and which sets of incentive
compatibility constraints bind depends on the allocation chosen. As a result, well known tech-
niques of working only with local incentive compatibility conditions cannot be utilized - a problem
faced in the multidimensional-type mechanism design literature as well. Instead, one is reduced to
using the Kuhn-Tucker technique (with possibly a large number of Lagrangian multipliers) and to
checking which sets of incentive compatibility constraints bind at the optimum. Nevertheless, our
methodology still simpliﬁes the problem of searching for the optimal mechanism: as we show in
t h ec a s ew h e nN = S + 2, generically there can only be a limited number of types obtaining rent
or having slack incentive compatibility constraints. Further, these types can be identiﬁed through
certain expressions involving the priors and signal similarity parameters.
The model in the paper has a single agent; with more agents, the principal’s problem is to
extract the maximum possible surplus from all these agents. Our basic methodology still applies
in such situations; however, the principal’s optimization problem is more complicated, especially if
the report of one agent can be used as a signal for the others (as in CM and the many applications
in MR).
Finally, we follow CM-MR-RS to assume that only the transfers are contingent on the signal
31realizations. If allocations can be chosen after the signals are realized, the optimal mechanism
may involve signal contingent allocation when full surplus cannot be extracted. (If the CM-MR-RS
conditions hold, on the other hand, the optimal allocation is the full information allocation and
is independent of the signal realizations.) An interesting research topic is to study the nature of
the optimal mechanism when both the allocation and the transfers can be made to depend on the
signals.
A Comparison with the RS condition
The Proposition in RS gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for full surplus extraction. Since
our approach to obtaining the condition in Corollary 2 is diﬀerent from RS, we show the two
conditions are equivalent.
Continue to deﬁne Q as the signal matrix, and to be consistent with the notations in RS, let
Qi· be the ith row of Q (i.e., Qi· = qi), let U be the N × N utility matrix, with uik ≡ u(xFI
i ,θ k)
being the element in the k-th row and i-th column. Let U·i be the ith column of U, i.e. U·i =
(u(xFI
i ,θ 1),...,u(xFI
i ,θ N)) . Then the RS condition is
Proposition 11 (RS) Full surplus can be extracted in problem (P1) if and only if for each i =





















⎦ =1 . (10)
First (in step 1) we transform the RS condition in (10) to a representation that uses our
notations. Then we show in step 2 that it is equivalent to Corollary 2
9In RS’s setup, the principal is the buyer and the agent is the seller so the transfer goes from the principal to
the agent whereas in our setup the transfer is paid by the agent to the principal. Furthermore, in RS, the “utility”
of the agent represents costs to the agent of producing the good, cik = C(x
FI
i ,θ k). Hence, in their proposition, the


















Because the q’s are (row) vectors of conditional probabilities, post-multiplying both sides of (11)
by a N × 1 vector of one’s, we know
ρN+1 − ρi =
 
j =i
ρj > 0. (12)
Thus, (11) implies that qi is in the convex hull of the other signal vectors. Consequently, such
ρ ≥ 0 does not exist for types θi, i ∈N 1,a n dexists for i ∈N 2. Hence, to check for full surplus
extraction, we only need to check the second condition in (10), and only for type θ˜ n (i.e., only for
i =˜ n).




˜ n ,θ j)+( ρ˜ n − ρN+1)u(xFI
˜ n ,θ˜ n)=1 ,






˜ n ,θ j) − u(xFI
˜ n ,θ˜ n)
 
=1 . (13)
Using our notation, the set N\  n is N1 and u(xFI
˜ n ,θ j) − u(xFI
˜ n ,θ˜ n)=fj(xFI
˜ n ). Further, q˜ n =
 
j∈N1 λjqj,a n dt h eλ’s are unique since {qj,j ∈N 1} forms a basis for RS. Thus, from (11) and
(12), we know λj = ρj/
 













  n )
⎞
⎠ =1 . (14)
Therefore, in the case of N = S + 1, the RS condition in (10) reduces to the condition in (14).
Step 2: In Corollary 2, full surplus can be extracted if and only if
 
j∈N1 λjfj(xFI




  n ) ≤ 0, (14) has no solution for non-negative ρ. On the other hand, if
 
j∈N1 λjfj(xFI
  n ) > 0, then there is a solution to (14). Thus, our condition in Corollary 2 is
equivalent to the RS condition.
33BP r o o f s
Lemma 1. Since i ∈N 1 implies yi / ∈ co{qk,k∈N} , this result is a direct application of Farkas’
Lemma which implies that if a vector qi does not belong to the cone generated by (or is not in the
convex hull of) a set of other vectors, no matter how many the other vectors there are, there exists
a hyperplane separating qi from the cone. However, to relate to the earlier results in the literature,
we provide a proof starting with the CM setup. Consider an arbitrary qi for some i ∈N 1. Parallel
to Theorem 2 of CM, Farkas’ Lemma implies existence of a vector yi ∈ RS, such that qiyi =0
and qkyi > 0 for all k ∈N 1. All we need to do then is to show that qjyi > 0f o rj ∈N 2 as
well. Since qj ∈ co{qk,k ∈N 1} (see Remark 1), there exist scalars {λk(j),k ∈N 1},λ k(j) ≥ 0,
 
k∈N1 λk(j)=1 , such that
 
k∈N1 λk(j)qk = qj. H e n c ew eh a v eqjyi =
 
k∈N1 λk(j)qkyi > 0.
Lemma 2. We prove the equivalence of the two schedules by showing that they represent the same
total contingent transfer, contingent on the realized signals. The total contingent transfer under
the original schedule is ˆ ti1 + ˆ yi, which can be rewritten as (ˆ ti + qiˆ yi)1 +(ˆ yi − qiˆ yi1)=ti1 + yi,
which is precisely the total contingent transfer under the new schedule.
Since the signal vectors are conditional probabilities, we know qj1 =1∀j ∈N.T h u s ,qiyi =
qiˆ yi − qiqiˆ yi1 = 0, i.e., yi is a PL.
Proposition 1. We ﬁrst note that the allocation is not changed for any type. Also, types whose
lotteries are already PLs in the mechanism {ˆ ti,x i, ˆ yi,i ∈N }have the same ﬁxed transfers and
lotteries in the mechanism {ti,x i,yi,i∈N} . Now, consider the case where j ∈N 1. As shown in
Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, there exist SLs for θj,a n dw ec h o o s eyj to be a SL with ||yj|| suﬃciently
large. If no type in the original mechanism obtains rent from having incentive to report θj,t h e n
the principal’s expected payoﬀ in the new mechanism equals that in the original one. If however
there is a type, say θk, in the original mechanism who obtains rent from having incentive to report
34θj, then similar to CM, tk can be increased from ˆ tk and the new mechanism is a strict improvement
for the principal.
Next, for the case when j ∈N 2, lottery yj can be chosen according to Lemma 2, so that the
new lottery for θj is a PL and the total expected payment of every type remains unchanged upon
reporting θj. Since the allocation is not changed for any type, and since the transfers of types, if any,
whose lotteries were already PLs in the original mechanism are not changed, the new mechanism
must satisfy participation and incentive compatibility constraints if the original mechanism did.
It follows that the principal’s expected payoﬀ in the mechanism {ti,x i,yi,i∈N }remain remain
unchanged when j ∈N 2 and is at least as high when j ∈N 1 as compared to the expected payoﬀ
in the mechanism {ˆ ti,x i, ˆ yi,i∈N} .
Proposition 2. Let εi > 0b et h es i z eo fθ 
is rent, i.e.
ti = u(xi,θ i) − εi, (15)
or from (C-i) in (P2)
zi = fi(x˜ n) − εi. (16)
Suppose λj  =0 ,a n dt y p eθj receives no rent but has a slack incentive compatibility constraint of
reporting θ˜ n.T h a ti s ,u(xj,θ j)−tj =0 , but u(xj,θ j)−tj >f j(x˜ n)−zj, implying zj >f j(x˜ n). Let
εj > 0 be such that
zj = fj(x˜ n)+εj. (17)
We will show that this schedule cannot be optimal as the principal can improve on it.






.S i n c eλj > 0, we know ε>0. Consider a new set of transfers{t 
k,k∈N 1}
satisfying t 
i = ti + ε, and t 
k = tk for all k ∈N 1\i. Since μi, the probability that the agent is of
type θi, is strictly positive, if the same allocation proﬁle can be implemented by the new transfers
{t 
k,k∈N 1} and a new ELP vector, say z , that satisﬁes λz  = 0, then the original schedule cannot
35be optimal. Thus, all we need is to ﬁnd a z  that satisﬁes λz  = 0, and together with {t 
k,k∈N 1}
satisﬁes (C-i) for all i ∈N 1 in (P2). We break up the discussion into two cases.
Case 1: εi <
λj
λiεj. Deﬁne the new ELPs z  as: z 
i = zi + εi, z 
j = zj − λi
λjεi,a n dz 
k = zk, for all





k + λiz 















Now consider constraint (C-i) in (P2). Substituting ti and zi from (15) and (16) into t 
i =
ti + ε = ti + εi and z 
i = zi + εi,w eg e tt 
i = u(xi,θ i)a n dz 
i = fi(x˜ n), satisfying (C-i).
For constraint (C-j), substituting zj from (17) into z 
j = zj− λi
λjεi,w eg e tz 
j = fj(x˜ n)+εj − λi
λjεi,
or




εi − εj < 0. (18)
Since θj obtains zero rent under the original schedule, tj = u(xj,θ j). This, together with (18),
implies that t 
j = tj and z 
j satisfy (C-j).
For k  = i,j,s i n c et 
k = tk and z 
k = zk,t h ef a c tt h a t( tk,z k) satisﬁes (C-k) in (P2) implies that
(t 
k,z 
k) satisﬁes (C-k) as well.
Note that in the new mechanism, θi obtains no rent and θj still has a slack incentive compatibility
constraint of reporting θ˜ n.
Case 2: εi >
λj
λiεj. Deﬁne the new EPL vector z  as z 
i = zi +
λj
λiεj, z 
j = zj − εj,a n dz 
k = z 
k,
for all k ∈N 1\i,j. Following steps similar to case 1, we can show λz  =0 ,a n dt h en e wm e c h a n i s m
with {t 
k,k ∈N 1}, z satisﬁes all the combined constraints (C-l), l ∈N 1, in (P2). In the new
mechanism, θj’s incentive compatibility constraint binds and θi still obtains positive (but lower)
rent.
As long as there exists some type θi who gets rent and some type θj whose incentive compatibility
constraint is not binding, we can go on applying the steps in Cases 1 or 2 until either no type gets any
rent or some type gets rent but no type has a slack incentive compatibility constraint of reporting
36θ˜ n.
Proposition 3. Suppose in a schedule with transfers {tk,k∈N 1} and ELPs z, rent is obtained
by a type θj where
μj





. We show that this schedule cannot be optimal as it
c a nb ei m p r o v e du p o n .




λj. Consider a new schedule with transfers {t 
k;k ∈N 1} and ELPs z ,w h e r et 




j = tj + εj, z 
i = zi −
λj
λiεj, z 
j = zj + εj,a n dt 
k = tk and z 
k = zk for k ∈N 1\i,j. Similar to the
proof of Proposition 2, we can check that the new schedule satisﬁes all the combined constraints





k + λiz 
















k;k ∈N 1} and z  implement the allocation proﬁle {xk,k ∈N} . Finally, the diﬀerence in























λi λj > 0, and εj > 0. Thus, the mechanism in which θj
gets rent is not optimal.









. The total expected rent is zero if no
types get any rent, and is equal to
 













[λifi(x˜ n) − λizi]
 
. (19)




j∈N1\I λjzj = 0. Since the incentive compatibility constraint
is binding for every type (from Proposition 2) and since the rent is zero for all θj, j ∈N 1\I,
we know that zj = fj(x˜ n), for all j ∈N 1\I. Hence, we have
 





j∈N1\I λjfj(x˜ n). Substituting this into (19), we obtain the expression in the Proposition.




k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n) is continuous in λ (with
 
k∈N1 λk = 1) for all i ∈N 1.T h e n Ψ ( λ) ≡
mini∈N1 [Ψi(λ)] is also continuous in λ. Thus the total expected rent, max{0,Ψ(λ)} is a con-
tinuous function of λ.
Proposition 5. From Proposition 4, we know that if full rent cannot be extracted, then the total
rent is
 
k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n), which by deﬁnition must be strictly positive. Thus if
 
k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n) ≤ 0,
full rent can be extracted.
Conversely, we now show that if full rent can be extracted then
 
k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n) ≤ 0. Suppose
not, i.e. suppose
 
k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n) > 0. We show this leads to a contradiction.
Since full rent can be extracted, i.e., θk gets no rent ∀k ∈N 1,w ek n o wzk ≥ fk(x˜ n), ∀k ∈N 1.




k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n). Thus
 
k∈N1 λkfk(x˜ n) > 0 implies
 
k∈N1 λkzk > 0, which contradicts the condition λz =0 .
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